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Strategic
partnerships also do not involve any transfer of national
sovereignty to a supranational authority, for example in political
integration attempts such as the European Union. The E.U.'s
official goals are ones of common security, free market
enhancement, shared sovereignty and the general underpinning of
the role of states in the global context. Political integration is
therefore aimed at both security and influence enhancement, but
national independence is sacrificed in order to implement common
monetary, fiscal and defense policies.
Instead, a strategic partnership is based upon the mutual goal of
increasing individual power and independence, thus allowing the
preservation of national sovereignty.
China, India, Russia and Germany
On April 11, two very significant events took place. The first
took place at the Hannover Fair in Germany, where Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on
eight different deals regarding cooperation in nano- and
bio-technologies, education, and oil and gas transportation from
Russia to Germany (via the planned Baltic pipeline). Russia was
already Germany's most important non-E.U. commercial partner, but
after these agreements, a new level of cooperation between the two
countries is on its way to being accomplished.
This is an evident sign of the rise of Germany's new foreign
policy, more independent from France than in the past and a proof
of Russia's desperate need to counter its own geopolitical decline
after years of successful Western penetration into Moscow's former
sphere of influence -- culminated with the Ukrainian pro-Western
stance of newly elected President Viktor Yuschenko. [See: "An
Assessment of the Franco-German Axis and the United States"]
The second major event was the Sino-Indian Agreement for Peace and
Prosperity, which established the basis for a peaceful resolution
of long-time border tensions between the two Asian giants, and
launched a new cooperation in economic and military affairs. The
first deal (on the borders) is the logical premise of the
strategic partnership. With the U.S. still determined to counter
Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region by carrying out a
U.S.-Taiwan-Japan alignment clearly aimed at containing Beijing,
Chinese President Hu Jintao rapidly started to look west. A new
course in the Sino-Indian relationship would have very important
consequences for South Asia's geopolitics, and for global politics
as well. India's success in computer science could soon work in
favor of China's military ambitions if the two countries appease
and stabilize their geopolitical conflict. [See: "Sino-Indian
Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Challenges Ahead"]
The deals between China and India, and Germany and Russia, are not
the only deals being formed. China is actually seeking out Iran
(for oil and gas) as well as Indonesia, while at the same time
trying to expand its economic influence in South America. France
has tried to upgrade its relationship with Japan (Chirac was in
Tokyo on March 28) proposing enhanced cooperation in high-tech
research, ecology and energy, with further developments still to
come.
All these bilateral talks, deals and agreements mark an emerging
trend in the international system at a time of unipolarity.
Unipolarity can be defined as the disproportion between the United
States and all other great and medium world powers in terms of
military might, technological innovation capability, diplomatic
and cultural influence, economic prosperity and ability to provide
security. The fall of the Soviet Union led many analysts to talk
about a coming multipolarity in the 21st Century, but the 1990s
saw the rise of the U.S. as the only global geopolitical
superpower. Washington is today the only real regional hegemon
because it is not only the premier military and economic world
power, but also the only great power whose security is not
threatened by neighboring states. Neither Canada, nor Mexico, nor
any South American state can be considered as a serious
geopolitical threat for the U.S. The same is not true for other
potential regional hegemons like Germany, Russia, India or China.
A unipolar system is, of course, subject to change like any other
polarity. A transition toward a bipolar or multipolar
configuration is possible under certain conditions, so that one or
more states accumulate enough power to emerge as "peer
competitors" against the only global superpower. However, it
is first and foremost important to understand how great and medium
powers try to act under unipolarity in order to understand many of
today's crises and conflicts and to predict future ones.
The Decisive Role of the Global Superpower
In a unipolar context, the way in which the global superpower acts
is decisive. Since states tend to enhance their power continuously
to better compete in world politics, the U.S. is likely to seek
hegemony. It is far from established, however, whether Washington
will prefer a "liberal hegemony" predicated upon
multilateralism and shared rules (as it appeared to do in the
1990s), or the consolidation of a unilateral, "imperial
hegemonic" turn. Washington's strategy will be crucial for
slowing or accelerating other powers' attempts to build a
multipolar world because it will change -- in one sense or another
-- these states' perceptions of U.S. intentions. After all,
hegemony is not merely a decisively superior military might, but
also the ability to gain other states' acquiescence to one's
leadership.
In order to be perceived as benign, a global leader must let its
own goals appear as coincident with other powers' ones. This has
proved more difficult than before for Washington at the dawn of
the 21st Century, especially because of widespread opposition to
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Washington's subsequent occupation and
stabilization of Iraq. [See: "Testing
the Currents of Multipolarity"]
However, in the present phase of international relations, great
and medium powers cannot afford a direct confrontation with the
United States, which is why classical balancing alliances are
unlikely. Since potential regional hegemons (France, Germany,
Russia, India, China, and Japan) are all placed in Europe and
Asia, an overtly anti-American and power politics-oriented
alliance between two or more of these countries could easily scare
neighboring states, thus helping the U.S. to build a
counter-alliance.
Moreover, U.S. military expenditure will likely equal all other
great powers' combined defense spending by 2007, which suggests
the uselessness of such an attempt. Even more important is that
the internal nature of the U.S. (liberal democracy) and its
geopolitical position of "offshore balancer" helps
Washington to be perceived as less threatening than other
historical great powers: after all, even if France and Germany
fear a diminution of their relative influence in the world because
of U.S. hegemony over the "Greater Middle East," they
know they will not be militarily invaded and dominated by the
United States.
Great and medium powers' strategy to preserve their influence and
to seek their interests is therefore a combination of engagement
and balancing, whose dominating character (engagement with the
U.S. or attempts to balance its power) is highly dependent upon
Washington's choices. Strategic partnerships like the Russo-German
or the Sino-Indian ones are potentially excellent ways to increase
one's capabilities without directly confronting the U.S. while at
the same time maintaining a high degree of independence.
The Origins of Political and Economic Integration Attempts
Political integration is nowadays often regarded as the most
advanced strategy to build new powerful geopolitical actors. The
European Union is the archetypical example of such a model, which
is often quoted as a pattern to be replicated by other regions'
states (Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, etc.). The E.U.'s
history is, nonetheless, often misunderstood in idealistic or
abstract terms. In fact, it should be remembered that the European
Community was strongly supported by the United States because of
the need to fully reintegrate West Germany into the Atlantic
Alliance and to counter the Soviet Union's expansion in Europe.
France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands all
found their own reasons to build a united Europe, one of which was
to keep the Americans "in." In 1948, Washington pushed
the Western European states to "take the first step" (by
creating the Western European Union) in building their common
defense. This fact is most of the time overlooked, just like, on
the other hand, some French Gaullist's ambitions of making a
confederated Europe a superpower is often mistaken as a
"European will" to rival the United States on a global
scale.
Many commentators said during the 1990s, and still say today, that
the European Union is soon going to be a world superpower. Fifteen
years after the Maastricht Treaty's negotiations, however, a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (C.F.S.P.) of the E.U. states
is still concretely missing. Although it exists officially and it
also has growing military capabilities and institutional assets,
C.F.S.P. lacks a common strategic concept -- simply because E.U.
member states do not always have clearly defined and shared
geopolitical interests. Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Poland, Belgium, and the Netherlands still have their
agendas and their relative position to the United States, as the
2003 Iraq intervention undoubtedly displayed.
History can't be "compressed" in a few years, and
European history is a history of nations and nation-states. The
paradox is that in 2005, with both the Euro and the newborn
European political-military institutions in place, precisely the
bigger supporters of European integration (France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands) are showing signs of malaise as the diminution of
national sovereignty (especially in monetary and industrial
policies) hasn't been compensated by the promised benefits of
continental unification.
Political and economic integration also appears to be a very
specific geopolitical process that can't be thoroughly understood
if disconnected by the superpower's policy. Two often compared
national political economies such as the German and Japanese
political economies are paradigmatic in this sense. Germany
successfully obtained its goals of an institutionalized, regional
economy, largely because American strategy for post-war Europe
allowed it (and supported it), whereas Washington was much more
cautious about a possible Asia-Pacific economic integration.
In fact, instead of an East Asian economic integration, Washington
favored a Trans-Pacific regional (informal) entity because it
feared that Japan could hegemonize an Asian-only organization at
American expense. The United States is also actively supporting an
all-American economic integration based upon the free market
(F.T.A.A./A.L.C.A.), opposing concurrent projects of a common
South American market (Mercosur) which could possibly benefit
Brazilian or Venezuelan stronger influences in the region. [See: "Washington
Loses Control of the O.A.S."]
Washington, in effect, supports political integrations much more
than it is usually thought, apart some important exceptions
depending on its interests and security concerns, and the success
chances of such integrating attempts by regional powers are
heavily influenced by American support or hostility.
Conclusion
Strategic partnerships like those previously mentioned are a more
and more frequent behavior characterizing great and medium powers
since the decade began. The historically unprecedented
configuration of the international system, dominated by American
military and technological capabilities, pushes regional powers to
act differently from what could be expected by just projecting
past patterns of behavior into the new era.
If states like China, India or Germany privilege strategic
partnerships in this phase, it is because they want to increase
their energy and technology acquisition capabilities, thus
creating conditions for a rapid accumulation of power. Compared to
complex integration processes like the European Union, strategic
partnerships do not involve national sovereignty transfers which
more often than not damage a state's capabilities, which is why
they are preferable under many aspects.
Like all kinds of bilateral relationships, strategic partnerships
are not static, but dynamic processes that can be reversed. We
shouldn't take for granted, therefore, that Russo-German or
Sino-Indian agreements will last forever or grow linearly.
Moreover, some states such as Germany appear to choose a complex
combination between regional integration policies (the E.U.) and
worldwide strategic partnerships (with Russia and possibly other
states). But at a time of U.S. unilateral behavior and continuous
military power display, we can expect these partnerships to
consolidate for the near future.
Report Drafted By:
Federico Bordonaro
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Analysis
16/07/11 new 
