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Moreover,
the Franco-German relationship is itself complicated and the axis
is certainly not monolithic. As French citizens are next to vote
for the E.U. Constitutional Treaty at the end of May, it's time to
assess the real geopolitical value of the Franco-German combine
and its relationship with the United States.
Assessing
this relationship in light of recent events, an accurate analysis
of a Franco-German constancy in front of Washington's geopolitical
moves shows some important nuances. After the terrorist attacks in
New York City and Washington D.C. in September 2001, France and
Germany joined together in backing the October 2001 U.S.-led
military operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan but
also joined in opposing the Bush administration's March 2003
invasion of Iraq.
Apart from these major events, other important developments saw
significant differences in French and German stances. For
instance, in 2004, Germany was the only E.U. country that did not
reprimand Russian President Vladimir Putin for his centralization
policy in Russia -- acting autonomously and not consistently with
Brussels' common foreign policy. France took a more drastic
pro-U.S. stance in Lebanon, urging Syria to end its military and
intelligence influence in that country because Paris still
cultivates hopes of exercising decisive influence in Beirut.
France has not fully backed Germany in its recent pro-Russian turn
(a turn largely due to oil and gas deals). Berlin, however, still
maintains good relations with Damascus, although discretely.
In order to understand the complexity of the
Paris-Berlin-Washington relationship after September 11, it is
important to analyze each state's interests and concerns in the
context of the post-bipolar international system.
France's Geopolitical Ambitions
France is not enthusiastic about the present unipolar phase of
international politics. Paris has lost a lot of its capacity to
maneuver after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the key French
foreign policy discourse from the mid-1990s is multipolarity. As
former French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin clearly
explained, Paris has developed a sophisticated view on
multipolarity. The defense of the U.N. Security Council and of
multilateral approaches is strategic for France because U.S.
unilateralism is likely to reduce Paris' influence in world
affairs due to the non-existence of a counter-balancing power in
front of the United States.
The French classical view of the political and economic
integration of Europe is therefore only comprehensible in the
broader context of a "balanced multipolar world"
advocated since 1989 by former French President Francois
Mitterrand's and President Jacques Chirac's administrations. For
instance, France never aimed to oust N.A.T.O. from Europe; Paris'
goal was instead to create rapidly a credible European common
security and defense policy together with a European monetary
union in order to reinforce a French and European role in the
transatlantic relationship -- obviously together with a strong
French lead, although expressed in a communitarian and
supranational fashion -- and subsequently in world affairs.
In order for these goals to be achieved, it would have been
necessary for the U.S. to accept a stronger political and
geopolitical European role. But in the winter of 1995-96, Chirac
failed to upgrade the Franco-American relationship because even if
France accepted her reintegration into N.A.T.O.'s commandment,
Washington didn't allow a European to become head of Allied Forces
Southern Europe. N.A.T.O., and not the Western European Union (as
Paris hoped in the early '90s), is nowadays at the heart of the
European security architecture, as can be read in the E.U.
Constitutional Treaty, whereas a common European defense, although
existing, only has limited, regional, projection power.
This evolution largely coincides with American, and not French,
wishes and expectations. At a time of being the unrivalled
superpower, it is not in Washington's interests to share power
with potentially competing states. However, France took part in
the U.S. and N.A.T.O.-led war against a traditional Serbian ally
in 1999, and the Franco-American "rift" then seemed to
be on its way to reconciliation.
Germany's Security and Strategic Doctrine
Germany had in fact another view of the Franco-German axis and of
transatlantic relations. Berlin's security doctrine has
traditionally (at least since 1949) been based upon two pillars: a
European one, for which the Franco-German cooperation was vital,
and a German-American one. This two-fold security architecture has
often made Germany a mediator between Atlanticism (traditionally
advocated by the U.K. and the Netherlands) and the idea of
"Europe-puissance," or a European superpower, elaborated
by former French President Charles De Gaulle and his successors. A
real Franco-German security concept is therefore missing since it
could only descend from a unique geopolitical vision.
National interests and perceptions, however, still matter. Paris
and Berlin actually forged a new strategic partnership in 1963,
with the Treaty of Elysée, not because they pursued an idealistic
vision of a new integrated and supranational Europe, but because
of their vital national interests. For France, Germany was, and in
many respects still is, the main security concern. After 1945,
Paris was worried by U.S. plans of reindustrializing and rearming
West Germany to better counter the Soviet Union as the Cold War
broke out in 1947. A united and integrated Europe, therefore, was
the only viable solution to realize both West Germany's
readmission in Western politics and her strict political and
military control by France, the U.K., the U.S. and the other
European states. For former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (and
later for former Chancellor Helmut Kohl), a Europeanization of
Germany was the inevitable step to grant Bonn's resurgence as a
European power and to ensure a future reunification.
The German anti-war stance in 2002-2003 was -- at least in part --
caused by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's electoral needs. With the
German pacifist movement still relevant for the vote, Schroeder
was able to use the international crisis to gain sympathies from
the anti-war movement, hence prevailing over his
Christian-Democrat adversaries.
Schroeder has nonetheless discretely helped American operations in
Kuwait, in the context of Iraqi Freedom, by sending GSG-9
counterterrorism squads and highly skilled anti-mine personnel.
Berlin has certainly stood with France (and Russia) insisting that
the U.S. war against Ba'athist Iraq wasn't justified, using the
official reason that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and his
determination to use them have proved false. Nevertheless, Germany
has used softer words than France in expressing dissent.
In fact, Berlin started a multi-faced strategy aimed at
reinforcing its sovereignty while at the same time emerging as the
most important E.U. nation-state. This strategy consists of three
main actions. German-American relations have been at the top of
Schroeder's priorities in 2003-2004, when the Social-Democrat
chancellor pushed for a transatlantic reconciliation by promoting
the new German-American Partnership in the 21st Century that some
French observers interpret as a possible German-American
condominium on Europe. The second pillar of this strategy has been
a constant advance in key E.U. bureaucracy positions, where at
least a German official is nowadays always present among the most
influential decision makers. Last, but not least, Berlin is
seeking out Moscow in order to forge a "strategic
partnership" (German technology and investment in exchange of
Russian fossil energy), which is likely to upset the U.S., with
the goal, in Schroeder's view, to become less and less dependant
upon Middle Eastern oil.
This new German activism -- probably also helped by the U.S.
decision to move troops eastwards (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania)
after 50 years -- has worried some of the finest
"connoisseurs" of German foreign policy. European
concerns of a German resurgence and of possible neo-hegemonic
ambitions still find their place in E.U. chancelleries, whether
justified or not. Moreover, the German economy's poor performance
in recent years and Berlin's unhappiness with the E.U. Stability
and Growth Pact cause fears of a German wave of
"euro-skepticism."
This is even more true since 2004, when consensus upon further
European integration dropped dramatically in E.U. founder states
like France, Italy and the Netherlands. Governments can't fully
admit their malaise with the European Union due to numerous years
of financial sacrifices made to enter the Euro-zone safely, but a
serious crisis is looming after 2004's big enlargement -- an
evolution that seems to have reduced "old Europe's"
influence over Central and Eastern Europe.
Conclusion
Germany and France are both unhappy with recent evolutions of the
European integration process, but they're reacting to it in
different and sometimes contradictory ways. France still perceives
Germany as a necessary structural ally to project her power
worldwide and to build "Europe-puissance." But as time
goes by, German foreign policy is less and less conditioned by the
20th century's disastrous totalitarian experience -- thus making
the Franco-German axis less central in Berlin's geopolitical view.
Paris and Berlin experienced in the 1990s that their goal of a
credible common security and defense policy is only viable when
they both have good relationships with London and Washington, and
that American influence in the old continent does not necessarily
decline as the E.U. proceeds in its integration.
Therefore, it's very likely that both Paris and Berlin will try in
the coming years to modify the E.U. Stability and Growth Pact to
their advantage -- although many less influential countries oppose
such aims for they fear a Franco-German domination of the E.U.
architecture. If Paris and Berlin succeed, a real European common
foreign policy could become even more complicated, as
pro-sovereignty movements could grow stronger in the two states.
Their relationship with the United States will probably continue
to be non-linear. A common Franco-German stance facing
Washington's future decision will sometimes appear, but bilateral
policies with the U.S. won't lose their crucial role.
Report Drafted By:
Federico Bordonaro
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Analysis
16/07/11 new 
