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Analysis
21/08/05 -
The
Franco-American Relationship: Will Reconciliation Last? - by Federico
Bordonaro
Abstract
: Paris and Washington seem to be heading towards reconciliation after
three years of divergence and misunderstanding. The arrival of a new
French government on the scene -- fully committed to revitalizing the
national economy and avoiding Paris' isolation in the West -- combined
with Washington's troubles in Iraq could be the right ingredients for a
fresh start, under the sign of a renewed multilateralism.
However, different geopolitical perceptions in the two capitals and
enduring geoeconomic competition between the two states are likely to
operate as powerful counter-forces to such an attempt.
Keywords
: Franco-American relationship, transatlantic relationship,
Atlantic Alliance, N.A.T.O., multipolar world, multilateralism,
multipolarity, European integration, European security, European
superpower, nation-states, geoeconomic spheres, geoeconomic
competition, geoeconomic warfare, economic nationalism, economic
patriotism,
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The Franco-American Relationship: Will
Reconciliation Last?
by Federico
Bordonaro, Strategic-Road.com Analysis 21/08/05
Signs
of a new shift in the Franco-American relationship appeared this summer,
after Dominique de Villepin took over from former French premier
Jean-Pierre Raffarin last June. On July 4, French Foreign Minister
Philippe Douste-Blazy attended U.S. Independence Day celebrations in
Washington and had friendly talks with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice. Douste-Blazy told the press that although Paris and Washington had
not agreed on everything in the last few years, they have always worked
together on vital security matters such as in Kosovo, Lebanon, and
Afghanistan. In particular, a month before the current nuclear crisis
peaked with the Iran issue, the French minister had explicitly confirmed
France's commitment to work for suppression of uranium enrichment
processes in proliferating countries, quoting a speech of Rice's on
November 15, 2004. He then met with a delegation of U.S.-based French
entrepreneurs and called for the strengthening of U.S.-France economic and
political ties.
Douste-Blazy's remarks are in line with his predecessor Michel Barnier's
proposals in February 2005 for a "fresh start" in
Franco-American relations. In addition, De Villepin's and Douste-Blazy's
harsh words against Tehran's nuclear plans could be indicative of more
concrete security cooperation between the U.S. and France.
However, the Paris-Washington relationship is becoming increasingly
complex, as geopolitical and geoeconomic friction between the two capitals
depends on their respective interests and perceptions, not merely on
contingency. France's view of a multipolar world and Paris'
industrial-military goals -- which include the critical issue of
weapons-selling to China -- are hardly compatible with the guidelines of
America's national security strategy.
The
Context
De
Villepin inherits a difficult domestic and international situation in
France. Its citizens and industrial elites are both unhappy with the
country's lackluster economic performance (despite much better results
than in Germany or Italy) and high unemployment. On the international
stage, France's opposition to U.S.-led operations in Iraq has caused Paris
to sustain a very harsh confrontation with Washington, which some analysts
judge to be too heavy a burden for France. As a consequence, the new
government's goals are first and foremost to revitalize the French economy
and to avoid possible international isolation.
De Villepin was chosen as new premier by President Jacques Chirac after
the referendum on the E.U.'s Constitutional Treaty was rejected by 54.8%
of French voters on May 29 -- an event interpreted as a clear refusal of
the government's previous policy. The French right-of-center political
landscape is currently under intense stress, as the more neo-liberal
Nicolas Sarkozy and the sovereignist conservative Philippe de Villiers are
on the rise as alternatives to Chirac's leadership.
The United States is meanwhile experiencing difficult times in Iraq --
where guerrillas maintain a fast tempo of deadly operations -- and also
facing other crises that many believe require a multilateral approach:
Iran is pursuing its nuclear agenda; a new Sino-Russian strategic
partnership is emerging in Central Asia; and Islamist terror is striking
in U.S.- allied countries, threatening to deliver devastating blows
against any country determined to support Washington's military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The timing seems to be right for attempting a true rapprochement between
the two countries. Especially after the E.U. Constitutional Treaty's
failure in France and the Netherlands, many decision-makers in Europe
would like to see the transatlantic relationship re-launched on a new
multilateral basis after the dramatic 2003 rift over the Iraq crisis.
Geopolitical
and Historical Coordinates
If
considered on a long-run basis, Franco-American relations show signs of
centrifugal and centripetal forces which work for periodic crises and re-alignments.
Notwithstanding the instability factors, it can be stated that the
transatlantic security architecture and the European integration proceeded
together toward consolidation during the Cold War, thus balancing France's
plans to build a strong Europe -- particularly during the Gaullist years
(1958-69) and those of the Mitterrand-Kohl combine (1983-92 in particular).
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, however, many observers -- and some
politicians -- argued that the European integration process would end up
giving rise to a new power bloc. This -- they forecasted -- would result
in the end of N.A.T.O. and a fierce geopolitical competition between a
Franco-German-led Europe and the United States. But the history of the
last 15 years shows that this prediction was false.
The very notion of Europe-puissance, e.g. an autonomous European
superpower, is French. And although some factions in Belgium, Germany and
(although to a very limited extent) in Italy too share that view, four
structural problems prevent such a notion from becoming a common political
goal.
First, modern European history is fundamentally based upon nation-states
which compete for power and influence, occasionally taking the form of
imperial states (such as Napoleonic France or totalitarian Nazi Germany)
which try to conquer and dominate the core of the continent. Such a
conflict-fraught history can't be easily erased, either practically or
psychologically. Consequently, European nation-states perceive a strong
Franco-German combine -- theoretically autonomous from the U.S. -- more as
an unknown entity, or even as a threat, than as an opportunity for their
security and interests. And this is especially true of Great Britain, as a
strong, influential and militarily relevant member of the E.U.
Second, the U.S. played an active role in the European integration process
and in the post-war European security architecture from the very start.
The Atlantic Alliance, N.A.T.O. and the transatlantic relationship must be
understood as an economic, financial and security enterprise, not merely
on a military-strategic level. It would have been extremely naïve to
think that Washington would abandon its European influence at all levels
after 1990. In fact, not only did N.A.T.O. not disappear in 1991, but its
new strategic concept -- as a cornerstone of European security policy --
triumphed in 1999, as France and Germany actively took part in a
N.A.T.O.-led military operation against Belgrade. Moreover, up to now, the
E.U.'s eastward enlargements have always been preceded by N.A.T.O.
expansions in the former Warsaw Pact's area.
Third, the European Union is nowadays a political unit of an unprecedented
type, whose sovereignty is strangely split between a national level --
which Europeanists consider doomed to disappear -- and the supranational
level. The result is a muddled and cumbersome decision-making process,
wholly incompatible with that of a true superpower. In addition, plans to
build a real European super-state inevitably stumble over the historical
and geopolitical reality of national states and identities.
Pro-sovereignty movements are in fact gaining strength in France, Great
Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, but they could easily appear
elsewhere in the Union.
Fourth, the technological gap between the U.S. and the E.U. countries as a
whole has in fact widened in some sectors following the end of the Cold
War; hence European nation-states are more or less dependent upon
Washington for some military technologies necessary for any real power
strategy.
In 1995-96, France attempted to "upgrade" the Franco-American
relationship with a new partnership, conceived by Paris as a stronger
European security identity (with a European commander for the A.F. South)
in exchange for France's full reintegration into N.A.T.O. structures.
However, Washington did not accept the agreement. Nonetheless, France
participated in U.S.-led operations against Serbia in 1999, N.A.T.O. and
the Atlantic Alliance remained at the heart of European security, and the
last century ended with the transatlantic relationship in a stronger state
than many observers had predicted in 1990-92.
After
September 11
Although
the new Bush administration was known to have a more unilateralist agenda,
it was unquestionably the post-9/11 geopolitical framework that witnessed
the most serious Franco-American disputes. This is due chiefly to the Iraq
crisis, for France, Germany and the E.U. as a whole had immediately backed
the U.S. in its move against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The 2003
Iraq war, on the contrary, was perceived by France and Germany as
unnecessary to fight al-Qaeda and dangerous for the stability of the
Middle East. Paris and Berlin did not refuse to align with Washington out
of pacifism, but instead because of their geopolitical calculus and
fundamental interests, although they successfully used the largely
pacifist public opinion at home to gain consensus. When France and Germany
aligned with Russia in 2003, they sought to save the U.N. from the U.S.'s
unilateralist thrust and to isolate Washington in its single-handed
attempt to seize control of the Middle East's pivot-state.
The Iraq crisis revealed the main structural problems in the present
Franco-American relationship. These problems are due to the two countries'
different views on general world affairs, on Europe and on terrorism. The
first two issues are directly linked.
While the U.S. perceives itself as a benign hegemon, the indispensable
nation for peace, stability and prosperity, and thus aims to maintain its
current full-spectrum dominance in political, military and economic
affairs, France strives to create a balanced multipolarity in which a
unified Europe would emerge as an autonomous U.S. ally supported by a
democratic Russia. In Paris' mainstream vision, the U.S., the E.U., Russia,
China, and India will be the new century's major economic and military
powers, who need to cooperate to preserve peace and wealth. The U.S.'s
grand strategy, on the contrary, is explicitly directed towards preventing
the rise of any peer competitor, and opposes the shift toward
multipolarity, although Washington appears perfectly aware of the
inevitability of China's rise as a major power in the Far East. The U.S.
backs the project for an enlarged and free-market-oriented Europe which
would include Turkey; France prefers a strong political union and is more
cautious when it comes to integrating Ankara.
On terrorism, France appears at times as the champion of a continental
European vision, distinctly more influenced by a pro-Third World
perspective than the American and British version. In brief, Paris is
unconvinced by U.S. proposals to create -- by military force and strong
policies -- a pro-Western "Greater Middle East," and inclines
toward increased European/Middle Eastern cooperation in the economic,
security and intelligence spheres.
Yet Paris knows very well that if it should seek to rebalance the world's
power relations against Washington, it will be able to count on very few
allies; on the other hand, if France seeks out allies to rebalance the
transatlantic relationship in agreement with the U.S., it is likely to
find many supporters. Moreover, as the terrorist threat is increasing in
Europe, a higher degree of cooperation with its Anglo-American allies is
needed by France.
Military and security affairs appear to be a good field to lay the
foundations for a renewed Franco-U.S. relationship. But geoeconomic
competition is likely to continue -- along with U.S. opposition to a
balanced multipolar order.
The
Reality of Geoeconomic Competition
Great
powers' strategies consist of different but inextricably linked spheres of
power, such as the military, political, economic and cultural fields.
Economic competition thus resembles geoeconomic warfare rather than
classic antagonism between companies. The U.S. has a very clear view of
how financial and industrial strategies influence geostrategic matters.
Washington has done everything it can to prevent the E.U.'s Galileo
satellite project from acquiring a military dimension, as it could help
other powers bridge the gap with the U.S.'s G.P.S. system; it has
successfully backed its own Boeing corporation against Airbus -- in
conflict with free-market principles -- and likewise actively supported
Chevron to prevent China's C.N.O.O.C. from taking over Unocal.
Additionally, the U.S. is lobbying to keep the E.U.'s embargo on high-tech
armaments sales to China. In brief, U.S. economic nationalism is very
often at odds with France's power strategy.
Last month, De Villepin made two moves which could reintroduce a more
"patriotic" view of economics in the French political and
industrial landscape. Firstly, he asked Finance Minister Thierry Breton to
stabilize the capital of major industrial companies considered vital for
French economic developments. Secondly, he announced a new directive for
next Fall, which would consist of allowing France to protect its own
companies in the event that a foreign group launches a takeover bid
against them. In the light of these two decisions, De Villepin's decision
to include Christine Lagarde in his government, as trade minister, could
be puzzling. Lagarde is widely known for having worked for U.S.
corporations. However, such a move could be a smart option for the purpose
of appeasing Washington and its business community while working to
revitalize France's national economy.
Moreover, the deep crisis in E.U. integration that surfaced last Spring
with the failure of two vital referenda on the Constitutional Treaty,
accompanied by a lack of enthusiasm towards the euro and concerns over
further enlargement of the Union, brings the seemingly overlooked issue of
national sovereignty back into focus. De Villepin's attitude toward
economic patriotism signals that the sovereignist political discourse is
gradually winning back consideration among French decision-makers.
If such a trend consolidates, a new clash between the Francophone and the
Anglophone geoeconomic spheres -- already traditional rivals -- appears
inevitable, as the communications industry and economic competition are
intertwined, and geoeconomic struggle necessarily consists of offensive as
well as defensive maneuvers.
What
to Expect
As
France's classic plans for an autonomous Europe-puissance based on
a strong E.S.D.P. seems to be losing momentum, Paris will try to maintain
an independent and incisive role in world politics by trying to influence
Washington away from unilateralism, while using China as an external hinge
to enhance its own industrial military policy, and backing Washington on
several security issues (Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea).
In the light of geopolitical constants and incidental circumstances, we
can expect De Villepin's government to launch a sophisticated policy,
consisting of a balanced mix of better political relations with Washington
and, on the geoeconomic plane, a more pronounced economic nationalism.
This means that the current attempts to re-launch a strong transatlantic
link based upon this renewed Franco-American relationship will suffer from
two structural obstacles: the French goal of balanced multipolarity in the
medium term, and economic competition on the global stage.
Washington's willingness to accept a renewed multilateralism and --
ultimately -- a multipolar order appears, in fact, to be heavily dependent
upon the outcome of its unilateralist attempt to reshape the "Greater
Middle East."
Look for geoeconomic realism to gain influence among French
decision-makers and play an enhanced role in France's policy.
Federico
Bordonaro
Federico
Bordonaro is an independent analyst in the field of geopolitics and a
collaborator to the Strategic-Road.com Analysis.
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