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Analysis
15/08/06 -
The Strategic
Implications of the Lebanese Cease-Fire - by
Federico
Bordonaro &
Jean-Philippe Miginiac
Cette analyse
a été initialement publiée par
The
Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
Following U.N. Resolution 1701, a cease-fire between belligerent forces in
Lebanon began on August 14. During the first hours after the cease-fire
took effect, both the Israeli Defense Forces (I.D.F.) and Hezbollah were
abiding by it, notwithstanding isolated incidents.
Security issues concerning the region's stability and the risks for the
U.N. international force that will be sent to Lebanon within ten days are
now the main concerns for global and regional powers. At the same time,
the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict and the subsequent U.N.-sponsored
cease-fire are having important political and strategic implications for
the Middle East's balance of power and, more generally, for the global
geopolitical chessboard.
Speaking to Lebanese television network al-Manar on the evening of August
14, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah delivered a significant speech. He
called Hezbollah's performance in the conflict a "historical and
strategic triumph." Nevertheless, his statement was expected, as part
of the "battle of communiqués" in which both sides claimed a
clear victory.
The political importance of Nasrallah's words lie instead in the political
plans that emerge from some
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key
phrases. He made clear that the Shi'a militia's heavy armament
"will constitute the basis for a strong Lebanese state,"
thus proposing himself and his organization as an all-national
leadership and explicitly de-legitimizing the Lebanese army,
saying that it is "unable to protect the country in case of
war." He then concluded by saying that Hezbollah will
actively take part in humanitarian assistance for the hard-hit
population and called it "immoral" to even talk about
the militia's disarmament.
The problem for the United Nations is that Resolution 1701
explicitly calls for such a disarmament; in paragraph 8, it states
that "there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other
than that of the Lebanese State" and, in paragraph 11e, it
decides that the multinational force shall "assist the
Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of
the area as referred to in paragraph 8."
Moreover, because the United States and the European Union agree
that Beirut's government must regain full control of its national
sovereignty, Nasrallah's declarations directly challenge their
views and signal Hezbollah's not-so-hidden political agenda: the
progressive rise to Lebanon's dominant political and military
force.
Therefore, the ground has been prepared for a difficult political,
diplomatic and strategic task. Political and military
decision-makers must not underestimate the serious security issues
that will concern troops sent to Lebanese territory and the
political consequences of a possible deterioration of the post-cease-fire
context.
The U.N. Resolution and its Security Implications
With Resolution 1701, the United Nations decided to strengthen its
current mission in Lebanon that was established in 1978 by raising
its numbers to 15,000 units in order to support Beirut's army,
which is called upon to guarantee the full implementation of the
Taif Accords (1989) and of U.N. resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680
(2006). France agreed to take the leadership of the force, while
Italy will provide up to 3,500 personnel. Spain, Portugal, and
Finland will also count among the likely participants, while
Australia, Canada, Malaysia, and Indonesia are among the non-E.U.
countries that are considering sending troops. Israeli Foreign
Minister Tzipi Livni told the press on August 14 that Israel's
approximately 30,000 troops would withdraw from southern Lebanon
only when the U.N. units arrived.
As with every U.N. resolution and international accord, it is
important to pay attention to the details and the language of the
text. Apart from the above mentioned paragraphs that will
inevitably cause friction with Hezbollah, the crucial issue is
that of the rules of engagement regarding the multinational force.
It is up to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to define the rules
of engagement on the basis of the resolution draft. The draft was
relatively loose on the military side of the matter and it is
likely that U.N. forces will do little more than self-defense.
As a consequence, if Lebanon is to fulfill its duties and ensure
the disarmament of Hezbollah, a serious problem will arise.
Nasrallah's words confirmed what was already clear to any observer
of recent Lebanese history: the Shi'a militia will not disarm
because its long-term goals are the final strategic victory over
Israel and the construction of a strong Lebanese state allied with
Iran, rather than one allied with the U.S.-Israeli combine.
Since Iran will continue to back Hezbollah, and Syria will do so
unless the United States engages Damascus in a broad diplomatic
effort to start a new, regional peace process that will not be the
same as pursuing Washington's proposed "New Middle East,"
the cease-fire appears fragile and may fail in the coming weeks or
months before the U.N. forces are able to effectively reshape the
political and security contexts.
The only real alternative to such instability is a comprehensive
regional political and diplomatic agreement with Tehran and
Damascus, which does not seem likely in light of the current
political orientations of the current U.S. and Iranian governments.
The Significance of the Cease-Fire
As a result of the July-August conflict, Hezbollah is winning the
information war within the Arab world even though it suffered
losses in the 32 days of the war. Israel decided to advance
cautiously and slowly on the ground after the air campaign because
it was concerned with the high number of casualties caused by
Hezbollah's fierce resistance.
According to Israel, it destroyed much of Hezbollah's longer-range
Zelzal missiles, killed approximately 500 guerrillas, disrupted
the militia's supply routes and eliminated some top officers.
Nevertheless, Israel failed to annihilate the organization's
offensive capability (which was the war's declared objective). [See:
"Intelligence
Brief: Israel's Strategic Security"]
Therefore, the perception of the I.D.F.'s performance in Israel
and in the world has been decisively affected by this result.
Public opinion -- and decision-makers themselves -- always recall
the stunning rapidity of the 1967 and 1973 Israeli victories
against Arab states. As a consequence, Hezbollah's steadfast
defense is being perceived as a political victory by many, and
especially by those in the Middle East.
What is more important is that Israel's air campaign and the
destruction it caused have strengthened Hezbollah's image at home
and abroad. Whereas in the first hours of the conflict many Arab
officials blamed the war on Hezbollah, this context changed after
Israel's disastrous bombardment of Qana and after other Israeli
actions that caused significant civilian casualties.
Therefore, Israel -- and the United States as its main supporter
and sponsor -- failed almost completely in their political
objectives to de-legitimize Hezbollah. Instead, Hezbollah can
claim a social and political victory.
Conclusion
It can be expected that Hezbollah will try to capitalize from its
political success as it will try to progressively take control of
the leadership in Lebanon. Beirut's current administration appears
weak, and the only variable that could change the balance of power
between Lebanon's Siniora government and Hezbollah would be a
massive influx of U.S.-E.U. military aid to Lebanon's army, which
could easily spark a very dangerous conflict between the latter
and Hezbollah.
On the other hand, if France and the other components of the U.N.
forces refrain from decisively upgrading Beirut's military
capabilities, the effective disarmament of Hezbollah seems
impossible to attain, thus putting the resolution and U.N.
credibility at risk.
With Hezbollah and its leader rapidly emerging as a dominant force
in Lebanon, expect Israel and the United States to consider all
available options to destroy what they perceive as an unacceptable
threat. Because of Tehran's deep involvement in Lebanon via
Hezbollah, the stage is set for a new phase in the U.S.-Iranian
conflict.
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