|
|
|
|
|
31/10/04
- Elections
américaines - Comment Ossama Ben Laden s'est échappé de Tora Bora il y
a trois ans ? - How Osama bin Laden got away three years ago...
Did
U.S. mistakes let bin Laden escape from Afghanistan 3 years ago?
Knight Ridder
30/10/04
"...Knight Ridder reporters Barry Schlachter of the Fort
Worth Star-Telegram and Jonathan S. Landay and photographers Carl
Juste and Peter Andrew Bosch of The Miami Herald were at Tora Bora
during the battle, and photographer David Gilkey of the Detroit
Free Press and reporter Drew Brown traveled there a year later,
interviewed Afghan fighters, retraced al-Qaida escape routes and
talked to Pakistani intelligence officers who were tracking al
Qaida.
Their reporting found that Franks and other top officials ignored
warnings from their own and allied military and intelligence
officers that the combination of precision bombing, special
operations forces and Afghan forces that had driven the Taliban
from northern Afghanistan might not work in the heartland of the
country's dominant Pashtun tribe.
While more than 1,200 U.S. Marines sat at an abandoned air base in
the desert 80 miles away, Franks and other commanders relied on
three Afghan warlords and a small number of American, British and
Australian special forces to stop al-Qaida and Taliban fighters
from escaping across the mountains into Pakistan.
"We did rely heavily on Afghans because they knew Tora Bora .
. . ," Franks wrote.
Military and intelligence officials had warned Franks and others
that the two main Afghan commanders, Hazrat Ali and Haji Zaman,
couldn't be trusted, and they proved to be correct. They were slow
to move their troops into place and didn't attack until four days
after American planes began bombing - leaving time for al-Qaida
leaders to escape and leaving behind a rear guard of Arab, Chechen
and Uzbek fighters.
"Ali and Zaman both assured our people that they had forces
in blocking positions on the Spin Ghar (mountains) when there were, in
fact, no people there," said a U.S. military
official who played a key role in the campaign. "So besides
taking Afghans at their word, we had no plans to bring up
sufficient forces to make up for perfidy."
U.S. reconnaissance photos showed what appeared to be campfires at
high altitudes along the trails across the mountains into
Pakistan. The Afghans said the fires belonged to sheep herders.
Instead, "they were exfiltrators, pure and simple," said
an American military official.
|
Zaman and Ali
began trying to negotiate an al-Qaida surrender even before they began
their ground attack. Then, on the second day of the attack, Zaman declared
a cease-fire. Ali and a third commander, Haji Zahir, who joined the attack
at the last minute, resumed fighting after a few hours, and the U.S.
bombing never stopped. But Zaman left open an escape route through the
Waziri Tangi valley.
U.S. intelligence analysts estimated that 1,000 to 1,100 al-Qaida
fighters, along with some of the group's top leaders, escaped the American
dragnet at Tora Bora.
A Pakistani official later told Knight Ridder that intelligence reports
suggested that some 4,000 al-Qaida members escaped and that 50 to 80 top
leaders paid Zaman or Ali as much as $40,000 apiece for safe passage out
of Tora Bora."
Lire également, Read also :
On
Kerry, Bush and bin Laden
Asia Times 26/10/04
"...The Tora Bora operation failed for two reasons. First, the
warlords and the narcotics barons played a double game. While ostensibly
helping the US forces, they kept bin Laden and his fighters informed of
the US military movements. Second, Pakistan, on which too the US depended
for sealing off its border with Afghanistan to prevent the escape of bin
Laden and other jihadi terrorists into Pakistani territory, quietly let
them pass.
In fact, bin Laden, who was incapacitated by a shrapnel injury at Tora
Bora, was shifted to the Binori madrassa in Karachi, where he was under
treatment until August 2002. Since then he has disappeared. He was keeping
in touch with his followers through video and audio messages until this
April. Since then, he has been observing even electronic silence..."
Inside
story of the hunt for Bin Laden
Guardian 23/08/03
"...But a Guardian inquiry has revealed that there are others.
Experts who have been following the attempts of the Pakistanis and the US
to find the al-Qaida leader have suggested that:
· The Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf, struck a deal
with the US not to seize Bin Laden after the Afghan war for fear of
inciting trouble in his own country;
· The al-Qaida leader is being protected by a three elaborate
security rings which stretch 120 miles in diameter; and
· The Pakistani special forces looking for him are no closer than
they were a year ago..."
How
al Qaeda slipped away
NeesWeek/The Bulletin 14/08/02
"...Some Afghans now claim that Qaeda leaders paid off another (supposedly
pro-American) warlord to allow safe passage. Others blame
American forces: the B-52s, they say, dropped their 2,000-pound ordnance
on the wrong escape route. Still others, including Ali, claim that
mysterious black helicopters swept in, flying low over the mountains at
night, and scooped up Al Qaeda’s top leaders. (Pentagon sources suggest
the choppers were theirs, dropping or plucking up Special Forces.) What is
not in dispute is that by mid-December, 1,000 or more Qaeda operatives,
including most of the chief planners and almost certainly Osama bin Laden
himself, had managed to escape. Efforts to capture them since then had one
notable success – the capture of key operative Abu Zubaydah in the
Pakistani city of Faisalabad in late March. But most of the top echelon
and even rank-and-file fighters are still on the loose..."
How Osama bin Laden got away
CS Monitor 04/03/02
"In retrospect, it becomes clear that the battle's underlying story
is of how scant intelligence, poorly chosen allies, and dubious military
tactics fumbled a golden opportunity to capture bin Laden as well as many
senior Al Qaeda commanders..."
"...And on Nov 29, Vice President Dick Cheney told ABC's
"Primetime Live" that, according to the reports that were coming
in, bin Laden was in Tora Bora."I think he was equipped to go to
ground there," Mr. Cheney said. "He's got what he believes to be
a fairly secure facility. He's got caves underground; it's an area he's
familiar with."..."
"...Between two and four days later, somewhere between Nov. 28 to
Nov. 30 - according to detailed interviews with Arabs and Afghans in
eastern Afghanistan afterward - the world's most-wanted man escaped the
world's most-powerful military machine, walking - with four of his
loyalists - in the direction of Pakistan..."
"...Pir Baksh Bardiwal, the intelligence chief for the Eastern Shura,
which controls eastern Afghanistan, says he was astounded that Pentagon
planners didn't consider the most obvious exit routes and put down light
US infantry to block them.
"The border with Pakistan was the key, but no one paid any attention
to it," he said, leaning back in his swivel chair with a short list
of the Al Qaeda fighters who were later taken prisoner. "And there
were plenty of landing areas for helicopters, had the Americans acted
decisively. Al Qaeda escaped right out from under their feet."
The intelligence chief contends that several thousand Pakistani troops who
had been placed along the border about Dec. 10 never did their job, nor
could they have been expected to, given that the exit routes were not
being blocked inside Afghanistan."...
"...Meanwhile, back in Jalalabad, the Afghan warlords enlisted by the
US to attack Tora Bora were also cutting deals to help the Al Qaeda
fighters escape.
In the shoddy lobby of the Spin Ghar Hotel in downtown Jalalabad on Dec.
3, Haji Hayat Ullah - a member of the Eastern Shura who, according to both
Afghan and Pakistani sources had long ties to bin Laden - asked for the
"safe passage" for three of his Arab friends.
After a 20-minute discussion with Commander Ali, which was overheard by
the Monitor in the empty hotel lobby, a deal was struck for the safe
passage of the three Al Qaeda members..."
"...The battle was joined, but anything approaching a
"siege" of Tora Bora never materialized. Ghamsharik says today
that he offered the US military the use his forces in a "siege of
Tora Bora," but that the US opted in favor of his rival, Hazret
Ali..."
"..."I paid him 300,000 Pakistani rupees [$5,000] and gave him a
satellite phone to keep us informed," says Mohammed Musa, an Ali
deputy, who says Ali had firmly "trusted" Khel.
"Our problem was that the Arabs had paid him more, and so Ilyas Khel
just showed the Arabs the way out of the country into Pakistan," Mr.
Musa adds.
Afghan fighters from villages on the border confirmed in interviews last
week in Jalalabad that they had later been engaged in firefights with
Khel's fighters, who they said were "firing cover for escaping Al
Qaeda."..."
Former
minister says fugitive Taliban leaders living life of luxury in Pakistan
Guardian 24/12/01
"Most Taliban leaders have escaped the American dragnet and remain
free because the Afghan and Pakistani authorities lack the political will
to arrest them, it was claimed yesterday..."
"...Secret deals with tribal leaders and Northern Alliance commanders
appear to have paved an escape route for Taliban leaders ahead of US
special forces.
Some disappeared without trace but others are so confident of not being
picked up that they have made little effort to cover their tracks, said
Mullah Almaj Khaksar, a founding Taliban member who served as deputy
interior minister in the fundamentalist Islamic regime..."
Ce qu'en disent les généraux américains,
What are saying american generals
War
of Words
By TOMMY FRANKS
New York Times 19/10/04
"According to Mr. Kerry, we "outsourced" the job to
Afghan warlords. As commander of the allied forces in the Middle
East, I was responsible for the operation at Tora Bora, and I can
tell you that the senator's understanding of events doesn't square
with reality.
First, take Mr. Kerry's contention that we "had an
opportunity to capture or kill Osama bin Laden" and that
"we had him surrounded." We don't know to this day
whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001. Some
intelligence sources said he was; others indicated he was in
Pakistan at the time; still others suggested he was in Kashmir.
Tora Bora was teeming with Taliban and Qaeda operatives, many of
whom were killed or captured, but Mr. bin Laden was never within
our grasp.
Second, we did not "outsource" military action. We did
rely heavily on Afghans because they knew Tora Bora, a mountainous, geographically difficult region on the border of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is where Afghan mujahedeen holed up
for years, keeping alive their resistance to the Soviet Union.
Killing and capturing Taliban and Qaeda fighters was best done by
the Afghan fighters who already knew the caves and tunnels.
Third, the Afghans weren't left to do the job alone. Special
forces from the United States and several other countries were
there, providing tactical leadership and calling in air strikes.
Pakistani troops also provided significant help - as many as
100,000 sealed the border and rounded up hundreds of Qaeda and
Taliban fighters..."
La
vérité sur l’Irak, l'Afghanistan et la guerre contre le
terrorisme : entretien avec le général Michael DeLong
CheckPoint 26/09/04
"...Et ce qu’il se passait à l’époque, lorsque ben
Laden était dans les caves de Tora Bora, c’est qu’il
s’agissait d’une zone tribale pleine de civils. Il était
impossible d’y aller avec des soldats de n’importe quelle armée
– et spécialement pour nous – parce qu’il aurait fallu les
affronter pour atteindre ben Laden. Que nous ayons pu l’avoir
reste à démontrer. C’était une tribu sur la frontière, et
les seuls types acceptés dans le secteur étaient les soldats de
l’armée pakistanaise. Et l’on sait combien il est difficile
de garder une frontière – prenez par exemple le Texas, le
Nouveau Mexique et l’Arizona.
Nous n’avons pas tué de civils sans nécessité à Tora Bora.
Nous savons de par nos multiples sources de renseignements que
nous avons blessé ben Laden. Mais il s’est effectivement enfui.
Si nous avions tué un grand nombre de civils, nos chances de
mettre sur pied des élections en Afghanistan n’auraient jamais
existé. C’était une décision diplomatique, et non politique,
afin de pouvoir réunir ce pays. Nous savions que tuer ou capturer
ben Laden était important. Mais se débarrasser d’Al-Qaïda et
donner au pays un sentiment positif et nationaliste était aussi
important...."
Osama
capture unnecessary, US general says
The Sydney Morning Herald 22/11/03
"A senior US general said today that al Qa'eda mastermind
Osama bin Laden had "taken himself out of the picture"
and that his capture was not essential to winning the "war on
terror"..."
|
Nous
vous proposons les liens ci-dessus pour votre recherche et
ces liens ne sauraient en aucun cas exprimer, évoquer ou refléter
une quelconque position de Strategic Road sur le
sujet. Certains de ces liens peuvent avoir une durée de vie
limitée et ne plus être accessibles au moment où ils sont
consultés. We offer this links for your
research and therefore they should not be construed as
evocating or reflecting any position of Strategic Road. Some
links can have a limited lifetime and may not be accessed
anymore where you'll click them.
|
Contactez-nous
si vous désirez acquérir une licence vous
autorisant à effectuer une copie de cette page sur votre DD ou
Intranet
|
|
|
