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Etats-Unis –
Les services de sécurité du Département de la Défense
s'inquiètent : Internet est devenu le principal moyen des
"entitées étrangères" pour collecter de l'information
auprès des entreprises US et de leurs employés. Leurs
recommandations pourraient aussi servir au "patriotisme
économique" des français…
Internet
: The
Fastest Growing Modus Operandi for Unsolicited Collection - US
Defense Security Service, DSS Counterintelligence Office July 11,
2003
"Based on reports of suspicious foreign contacts submitted
to the Defense Security Service (DSS), the Internet is the fastest
growing modus operandi of unsolicited correspondence using
computer elicitation between foreign entities and cleared U.S.
companies and their employees. Reports continue to arrive at DSS
about foreign entities using the Internet to contact a wide
variety of knowledgeable persons, with the intention to collect
various pieces of information from each based upon their area of
expertise. This information is then put together in an amazingly
clear mosaic, revealing a level of detail that no one individual
would have been able to provide.
Use of the Internet offers a variety of advantages to a foreign
collector. It is simple, low cost, nonthreatening, and relatively
risk free for the foreign entity attempting to collect classified,
proprietary, or sensitive information. These foreign entities can
remain safe within their own borders while sending hundreds of
pleas and requests for assistance to targeted U.S. companies and
their employees. The unsolicited request for information,
including use of the Internet, is the most frequently used modus
operandi by "closed countries" and may often be worded
to appeal to cultural commonalities.
One recent Internet request, sent from a foreign entity to cleared
U.S. contractors, was a blatant unsolicited request for references
to military projects that use software tools for networked,
real-time operating systems (airborne, space, missile, tactical,
intelligence, etc.). In the request, the foreign entity
acknowledged much of the information would probably be classified.
He also acknowledged his foreign "military customer" was
too classified to be directly involved in sending the request over
the Internet, so he was performing the request as a service to the
foreign government.
In another report of suspicious activity involving the Internet, a
cleared U.S. company received a request to market a software
program, with intelligence applications, to intelligence and
security organizations in an Eastern European country. The
software program enables the quick integration of multiple data
sources and millions of documents with incredible speed, and can
be used as an investigative tool to search various Web sites. At a
minimum, the software program can be used by foreign companies to
acquire competitive business intelligence off the Internet.
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In many foreign countries, access to the Internet is potentially
through a government host. Any foreign contact with these
countries via the Internet is subject to intelligence and security
service vetting and monitoring to prevent the loss of technical
secrets and collection and exploitation of western technology.
Access to Internet search software will undoubtedly assist foreign
intelligence and security services in searching and monitoring the
Internet for both intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.
In one East European country during the past two years, the number
of Internet hosts have grown exponentially, making it more
difficult to isolate intelligence officers attempting to use the
Internet to break into U.S. computer systems. Foreign intelligence
services are known to use computers to conduct rudimentary on-line
searches for information, including visits to government and
defense contractors' on-line bulletin boards or Web sites on the
Internet. Access to Internet advanced search software programs
could possibly assist them in meeting their collection
requirements.
While the use of advanced software tools by foreign intelligence
and security services is inevitable, security lessons can be
learned from these reported incidents and we can implement
security countermeasures to mitigate demonstrated vulnerabilities.
We know foreign entities use the Internet because it provides an
easy, low-cost, risk-free means to solicit information. We also
know foreign intelligence and security services monitor the
Internet and have the advanced software tools to make their
searches and investigations much easier.
All requests for information received via the Internet should be
viewed with suspicion. Only respond to people who are personally
known and only after verifying the identity and address of the
requester. Verification is important, as the possibility exists
for foreign entities to present themselves as impostors. If a
request is received from an unknown source or is not in character
with the nature of requests normally made by a known source, a
copy of the request should be provided to the security office and
the request should not be responded to in any way.
The following is a list of suspicious indicators of foreign
collection efforts via computer elicitation:
- The
address is in a foreign country.
- The
recipient has never met the sender.
- The
sender identifies his/her status as a student or consultant.
- The
sender identifies his/her employer as a foreign government, or
states that the work is being done for a foreign government or
program.
- The
sender asks about a technology related to a defense-related
program, project, or contract.
- The
sender asks questions about defense-related programs using
acronyms specific to the program.
- The
sender insinuates the third party he/she is working for is
"classified" or otherwise sensitive.
- The
sender admits he/she could not get the information elsewhere
because it was classified or controlled.
- The
sender advises the recipient to disregard the request if it
causes a security problem, or the request is for information
the recipient cannot provide due to security classification,
export controls, etc.
- The
sender advises the recipient not to worry about security
concerns.
- The
sender assures the recipient that export licenses are not
required or not a problem."
Plus généralement, le document ci-après, que Strategic-Road.com
met à votre disposition (pdf), récapitule tous les indicateurs
suspects et les contre-mesures de sécurité à envisager pour
contrer les tentatives des "entitées étrangères" :
Suspicious
Indicators and Security
Countermeasures for Foreign Collection Activities Directed Against
the U.S. Defense Industry - US
Defense Security Service, DSS Counterintelligence Office
Voir
également dans le Club
Strategic Road :
Sources ouvertes  28/09/03
: Contre-intelligence et
sécurité industrielle aux Etats-Unis - 65 liens essentiels
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