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Terrorisme -
Les experts s’interrogent sur les nouvelles stratégies d’Al
Qaeda…
The
emergence of hyperterrorism
Asia Times 17/03/04
« …The "al-Qaedization" of terrorism in
Europe is a political "big bang". According to
intelligence estimates in Brussels, there may be an invisible army
of up to 30,000 holy warriors spread around the world, which begs
the question: how will Western democracies be able to fight them?… »
« … They stress that al-Qaeda's real danger is "their
persistent capacity to incite and collaborate with local
groups" - they estimate there may be around 40 of these - to
act in their own countries. "But we are even more concerned
about groups that we don't know anything about."… »
« … Roy says that recruiting is now being conducted
locally because "mobility is more difficult; there is not a
place anymore where one goes to meet the chief or to get
training". Recruiting campaigns continue all over the EU. For
instance, one of the perpetrators of the bombing of the UN office
in Baghdad in August 2003 was recruited in Italy. Other recruits
in Spain, Germany and Norway ended up in Iraq via Syria. Global
jihad, of which al-Qaeda is the leading exponent, is above all an
idea. It thrives on spectacular terrorist attacks. Targets may
have no strategic interest: what matters is terror as a spectacle
- like bombing a nightclub in Bali. Madrid represented something
much more sophisticated because in the Western collective
consciousness it was the link between an American ally and the war
on Iraq… »
« … Al-Qaeda is a nebula in total dispersion, locally and
globally… »
The
al-Qaeda franchise
Asia Times 17/03/04
« Although the investigation into the recent bombings in
Spain is still underway, three different scenarios have
emerged, each of which suggests a number of worrisome issues,
particularly in the context of the US-led "war on
terror". The first scenario, pointing to the Basque ETA
separatist organization as the culprits, was the initial
reaction that emerged from Spanish authorities and remained
firmly entrenched as Madrid's official position for some time…. »
« …The second scenario under consideration focuses on
al-Qaeda, with the assistance of local activists… »
« …The most intriguing analysis, however, is found in
the third scenario, suggesting a new alliance between radical
elements of the ETA and the al-Qaeda network. This scenario
rests on several important, although still somewhat disparate,
factors. The first link in this analytical ETA-al-Qaeda chain
rests with an individual: Yusuf Galan, a Spanish national (and
Islam convert) charged with ties to al-Qaeda back in November
2001. The second link is operational, stemming from a reported
record of ETA supplying explosives to Islamic terrorists in
general, and to the Palestinian militant group Hamas, in
particular. Such a linkage also raises fears in neighboring
France, which has its own recent history of ETA members
operating on its territory.
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Adding to the complexity of the investigation, there is also a
deeper level of troubling trends in this possible ETA-al-Qaeda
combination. Specifically, the revelation that some 80 radical
ETA militants were reportedly in Iraq prior to the war and
that some were allegedly implicated in the November 2003
killing of seven Spanish intelligence agents in Suwayrah raise
new fears of a renewed terror threat. In fact, two of these 80
radical ETA members that were in Iraq were later arrest by the
Spanish authorities as they attempted to transport some 500
kilograms of explosives to Madrid on February 29. Endowing ETA
with a new global reach based on a tactical alliance with the
al-Qaeda network and/or the Iraqi insurgency would
significantly "raise the stakes" in the current
round of the war on terrorism, with troubling implications for
a Europe set to become only more vulnerable with the looming
expansion of its visa-free borders… »
« … Regardless of which scenario turns out to be the
most accurate, there is perhaps an even more significant
lesson that this speculation over the responsibility for the
attacks has tended to obscure: what it reveals about the
transformation of al-Qaeda… the renewed focus on the group
has demonstrated that it has substantially changed from Osama
bin Laden's al-Qaeda of September 11, 2001. This
transformation consists of a move from what is defined as
al-Qaeda from the "corporate terrorism" structure
under bin Laden's direct control to what has more recently
been termed as a "terror franchise"… »
In
Iraq anche le brigate basche
In Iraq anche un ottantina di baschi. Forse fu opera loro l'attacco ai soldati spagnoli del 29 novembre: 7 morti
Corriere della Sera 12/03/04
« … La Brigata Euskal Herria, Territorio basco,
partecipò alle operazioni di contrasto all’attacco delle forze
americane a Bagdad. Era composta da giovani militanti dell’Eta
disposti all’estremo sacrificio della vita… »
Lire également :
Terror's
Next Stop
Newsweek 18/03/04
Al
Qaida et ses rivaux
Courrier International/Newsweek 18/03/04
« … A l’époque des attentats du 11 septembre, Al
Qaida était la seule organisation à avoir déclaré une guerre
totale aux Etats-Unis. Aujourd’hui, explique Milt Bearden,
ancien chef d’agence de la CIA au Pakistan, "je pense que
la menace terroriste a développé des métastases, si bien que
nous sommes maintenant incapables de savoir où elle se
manifestera la prochaine fois"… Dans tous les cas, les
autorités ne sont pas en mesure de déterminer quels sont les
groupes impliqués, et à qui ils sont liés, s’ils prennent
effectivement leurs ordres d’Al Qaida ou s’ils se contentent
de coexister avec le réseau du "Saoudien*"… »
« … Ce que l’on sait, c’est que des cellules
terroristes de tout type infestent le Moyen-Orient, l’Europe, l’Afrique
et certaines régions d’Asie… »
« … Les enquêteurs internationaux divergent grandement
quant à l’importance du réseau Al Qaida historique dans ces
nouvelles organisations. Autrement dit, dans quelle mesure ces
nouveaux groupes cohabitent-ils avec le réseau au lieu de
simplement obéir à ses ordres ? A Washington, les responsables
ont tendance à considérer aujourd’hui Ben Laden comme une
présence symbolique… Les autres gouvernements, en
revanche, ont tendance à estimer que le Saoudien et [son second]
Zawahiri sont les plus actifs sur le plan opérationnel… »
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