|
|
|
|
|
Royaume
Uni
- Le rapport explosif de Lord Butler et les
questions posées à Tony Blair -
Lord Butler's explosive report : The charge
leaves Blair open to serious questions...
Spy
chiefs 'withdrew' Saddam arms claim
Guardian 11/07/04
"Tony Blair's claim that Saddam Hussein posed a 'current
and serious' threat to Britain is challenged by dramatic new
allegations today that Britain's spy chiefs have retracted the
intelligence on which it was based.
The supposed proof that the Iraqi dictator was still trying, even
in the run-up to war, to produce chemical and biological weapons
became crucial to the Prime Minister's case for urgent military
action rather than waiting for inspectors to finish their task.
Yet, according to a senior intelligence source interviewed by
BBC1's Panorama tonight, MI6 has since taken the rare step of
withdrawing the intelligence assessment that underpinned the claim
that Saddam had continued to produce WMD - an admission that it
was fundamentally unreliable.
The charge leaves Blair open to serious questions over why, if the
nature of the proof had changed, he did not tell the public that
the evidence of WMD was crumbling beneath him..."
What
Tony Blair would say to God
The Observer 11/07/04
"The latest inquiry into how the Prime Minister took
Britain to war can be damaging but it won't be the final
verdict..."
Whose
Head Will The Butler Serve Up?
Sunday Herald 11/07/04
"IF the former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook is anything
to go by then the entire Cabinet and the whole upper echelon of
British intelligence should be roasted on a spit by the Butler
Inquiry, which is due to report on Wednesday.
Cook says that John Scarlett told him before the war in Iraq that
Saddam Hussein did not have any weapons of mass destruction that
could be fired over long distances at strategic cities.
Scarlett is the former chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) which wrote the infamous dossier laying out the
government’s case for war – and the man who is now to take
over MI6 – and Cook’s recollection of his comments is in
direct contradiction to the dossier’s claim that Saddam could
hit UK assets with WMD within 45 minutes.
|
If Cook knew this, Scarlett must have told other senior government
figures including Tony Blair and Scarlett’s “mate” Alastair
Campbell, then Blair’s director of communications. “I still
find it perplexing,” says Cook, “why Number 10 came to a
different conclusion.
“The government had made up their mind that Saddam had weapons
and must be a threat; they had made up their mind they were going
to war. The intelligence agencies were then left in a position of
having to find evidence to support a conclusion.”
Lord Butler’s inquiry into the use of intelligence in the run-up
to the war in Iraq has also turned up proof that in March 2002 a
meeting of government officials in Downing Street decided that
available intelligence was not strong enough to support the case
for war. Critics will seize on this as proof that the case for war
was a political one..."
Full
text: the Butler report (pdf)
|
Nous
vous proposons les liens ci-dessus pour votre recherche et
ces liens ne sauraient en aucun cas exprimer, évoquer ou refléter
une quelconque position de Strategic Road sur le
sujet. Certains de ces liens peuvent avoir une durée de vie
limitée et ne plus être accessibles au moment où ils sont
consultés. We offer this links for your
research and therefore they should not be construed as
evocating or reflecting any position of Strategic Road. Some
links can have a limited lifetime and may not be accessed
anymore where you'll click them.
|
Contactez-nous
si vous désirez acquérir une licence vous
autorisant à effectuer une copie de cette page sur votre DD ou
Intranet
|
|
|
